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ABSTRACT
As neural networks continue their reach into nearly every
aspect of software operations, the details of those networks
become an increasingly sensitive subject. Even those that de-
ploy neural networks embedded in physical devices may wish
to keep the inner working of their designs hidden – either to
protect their intellectual property or as a form of protection
from adversarial inputs. Prior work has demonstrated that
image classifiers can be attacked with nearly imperceptible
malicious perturbations to intentionally cause misclassifica-
tion of the recognized outputs and that details of the network
structure are critical to carrying out such attacks with high
probability. We show that physical deployments of these net-
works running on microprocessors and GPUs unfortunately
shed incredibly detailed information about internal network
structure on easily probed interfaces.
The specific problem we address is how, given noisy and
imperfect measurements of the off-chip memory buses, one
might reconstruct the the neural network architecture includ-
ing the set of layers employed (e.g. ReLU, Convolution,
etc), their connectivity, and their respective dimension sizes.
Considering both the intra-layer architecture features and the
inter-layer temporal association information introduced by
the DNN design empirical experience, we draw upon ideas
from speech recognition to solve this problem. We show
that off-chip memory address traces and PCIe events pro-
vide ample information to reconstruct such neural network
architectures accurately. We demonstrate that these concepts
work experimentally in the context of an off-the-shelf Nvidia
GPU platform running a variety of complex neural network
configurations, and that the result of this reverse engineer-
ing effort is directly helpful to those attempting to craft ad-
versarial inputs. In the end, our techniques achieve a high
reverse engineering accuracy and improve the one’s ability
to conduct targeted adversarial attack with success rate from
14.6%∼25.5% (without network architecture knowledge) to
75.9% (with extracted network architecture).
1. INTRODUCTION
Machine learning approaches, especially deep neural net-
works (DNNs), are transforming a wide range of application
domains, such as computer vision [1–3], speech recogni-
tion [4], and language processing [5–7]. Computer vision
in particular has seen commercial adoption of DNNs with
impacts across the automotive industry, business service, con-
sumer market, agriculture, government sector, and so forth [8].
For example, autonomous driving, with $77 billion projected
in revenue by 2035, has attracted the attention of giants in-
cluding Tesla, Audi, and Waymo [9–12]. Despite the rising
opportunities for DNNs to benefit our life [13], the security
problems introduced by DNN systems have emerged as an
urgent and severe problem, especially for mission critical
applications [14–17].
As DNN models become more important in system design,
protecting DNN model architecture information becomes
more critical both due to security concerns and intellectual
property protection. Black-box DNNs that encapsulate the
internal model characteristics information, have become the
mainstream in the AI development community. By extracting
the model information, attackers can not only counterfeit the
intellectual property of the DNN design, but also conduct
more efficient adversarial attacks towards the DNN system
[18, 19]. The commonly-used deployment strategy, “Cloud
Training Edge Inference”, makes the model extraction more
destructive. It is appealing for attackers to do the physical
inception on edge devices, because the success of hacking
one device can be leveraged to unlock many other devices
sharing the same neural network model.
The AI community envisions the importance of the neural
network security and abundant studies come out. Prior studies
mainly conduct model extraction through detecting the deci-
sion boundary of the victim black-box DNN model [20, 21].
Nevertheless, such approach demands significant compu-
tational resources and huge time overhead: given the pre-
knowledge of the total number of layers and their type infor-
mation, it still takes 40 GPU-days to search a 7-layer network
architecture with a simple, chain topology [19]. Even worse,
this approach cannot accommodate state-of-the-art DNNs
with complex topology, e.g., DenseNet [22] and ResNet [23],
due to the enlarged search space of possible network archi-
tectures.
Real attackers actually have more information at their dis-
posal than might be suggested by algorithm-centric attacks.
We show that a more systematic approach, using architec-
turally visible information has a great deal of power. A com-
plete DNN system includes several components: the DNN
model, the software framework, and the hardware platform.
These components are not independent of each other. In-
formation leakage from the hardware platform, for example,
could expose the kernel events in the DNN model execution
and potentially unveil the entire DNN model.
Unlike the attacks on accelerators [24], attacking on GPU
platform are much challenging because of the heavier system
stack and deeper memory hierarchy. With the system stack,
DNN layers are transformed into many GPU-kernels dynam-
ically during run-time(Figure.3). E.g., A single CONV can
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end up with >10 GPU-kernels under different implementa-
tions(e.g. Winograd/Fourier,etc.); then with 65-1500 kernels
for a typical DNN, it is difficult to even figure out layer
number/boundary, not to mention their structure/connection.
Accelerator attacks [24] do not consider such problem. Ad-
ditionally, the unique comprehensive memory optimization
on GPU raise the difficulty, because of: (1) unknown address
mapping from logic address to physical address, and then
to device address; (2) noisy memory traffic for intermediate
data(For example, the data with read-only access may come
from workspace in cuDNN); (3) incomplete memory accesses
due to optimization for data reuse and computing parallelism.
Therefore, it is extremely challenging to accurately identify
the layer sequence based on the imperfect execution statistics
(with filtering and run-time scheduling) of very long kernel
sequence (10x 1000x).
To address these issues, we propose a methodology which
extracts models fully exploiting both architecture execution
features visible off-chip (e.g. memory access behavior) and
priors learned from the rich families of DNN now in opera-
tion. Considering both the intra-layer architecture execution
features and inter-layer temporal association likelihood, we
draw upon ideas from speech recognition to achieve accu-
rate model extraction. A central idea of the paper is that
inter-layer DNN architecture features can be considered “sen-
tences” in a language of DNNs. Just like natural language
our reading of any individual “word” may be quite error
prone, but when placed into the context of the “sentence” we
can find a parsing that maximizes the likelihood of a cor-
rect match far more effectively than character-by-character
approaches ever could. We show that off-chip memory ad-
dress traces and PCIe events provide ample information to
reconstruct neural network architecture accurately with this
greater context. In a summay, we are the first to propose
and demonstrate end-to-end attacks in the context of an
off-the-shelf Nvidia GPU platform with full system stack,
which urges the demand to design secure architecture and
system to protect the DNN security .
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We propose a holistic method which considers both the
intra-layer architecture features and inter-layer temporal
association likelihood introduced by the DNN design em-
pirical experience to conduct accurate model extraction.
We show that off-chip memory address traces and PCIe
events provide ample information to reconstruct neural
network architecture accurately.
• We formalize the neural network architecture extraction
as a sequence prediction problem, and solve this problem
with a sequence model using analogous speach recogni-
tion techniques that achieves high accuracy and generality.
Building upon this information, we show how one can re-
construct the layer topology and explore dimension space
with the assistance of the memory bus traffic information,
and finally form the complete neural network architecture.
• We experimentally demonstrate our methodologies on an
off-the-shelf GPU platform. With the easy-to-get off-chip
bus communication information, the extracted network
architectures exhibit very small difference from that of the
victim DNN models.
• We conduct an end-to-end attack to show that the extracted
model boosts the attacking effectiveness of adversarial
attack, which introduces 50.4% improvement of attacking
success rate compared to cases without neural network
architecture knowledge. We demonstrate that memory
address traces are able to damage the NN system security
which urges hardware security studies(e.g.ORAM), raising
the attention of the architecture/system community to build
more robust NN system stack
2. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
In this section, we introduce the background of model
extraction and existing model extraction techniques.
2.1 Model Characteristics
Model extraction attacks aim to explore the model char-
acteristics of DNNs for establishing a near-equivalent DNN
model [25]. It is the initial step for further attack. For exam-
ple, to attack a victim black-box model, the adversary needs
to build a substitute model for generating adversarial exam-
ples [16, 17, 20, 21], while the similarity of characteristics
between substitute and victim models strongly impacts the
effectiveness of these adversarial examples [18, 19].
The model characteristics one would hope extract include:
(1) network architecture consists of layer depth and types,
connection topology between layers, and layer dimensions
(including channel number, feature map and weight kernel
size, stride, and padding etc). (2) parameters include the
weights, biases, and Batch Normalization (BN) parameters.
They are updated during stochastic gradient descent (SGD) in
the training process. (3) hyper-parameters include the learn-
ing rate, regularization factors, and momentum coefficients,
etc. The hyper-parameters are statically configured at the
beginning and will not be updated during SGD.
Among all of the model characteristics, the network ar-
chitecture is most fundamental for NN security. The model
parameters, hyper-parameters, and even training data may
be inferred with the knowledge of the network architec-
ture [25, 26]. Moreover, previous work [18, 19] observes
that the network architecture similarity between the substi-
tute and victim model plays a key role for attack success
rate.
2.2 Algorithm vs. Holistic Approaches
Software Stack
Hardware Platform
Black-box model
Input
Output
Model Model 
design philosophy
Architecture 
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Accurate 
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Candidate 
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Figure 1: (a) Prior approach merely relying on algo-
rithm; (b) Proposed holistic approach.
Many algorithms designed for model extraction have been
proposed [19,25]. Unfortunately, they require the prior knowl-
edge of the network architectures and significant computation
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demands. As shown in Figure 1, the key idea of an algorithm-
centric approach is to search the models in the candidate
model zoo to find the one with closest decision boundary as
the victim model. The models in the candidate model zoo
are trained with the input and output obtained by querying
the victim model. However, it is extremely challenging to
apply this type of method to extract complex DNN models.
Two different networks may have the similar input–output
responses for most queries, which makes such methods in-
herently inaccurate. Furthermore, unlike the parameters, the
network architecture cannot evolve dynamically during the
learning process. The result of these challenges is that we
need to enumerate all possible network architectures to find
the closest one, which consumes significant computation re-
sources. It is almost impossible to find the victim model
which hasn’t been released before.
We explore the opportunity for architecture execution fea-
tures to be exploited to help achieve better model extraction
in another perspective, as shown in Figure 1. Although prior
studies starts to consider the potentiality of leveraging archi-
tecture information leakage [24], prior work focuses on the
customized FPGA DNN accelerator which have less complex
system dynamics which then results in a system easier to
reverse engineer. In this work, we demonstrate end-to-end
attacks extractions in the context of GPUs which pull from
a richer set of possible layers and suffer from much noisier
architectural measurements. When we consider both layer
architecture features and the inter-layer association probabili-
ties, we show that it is still possible to conduct accurate model
extraction even with the architecture and system noises.
3. ATTACK OVERVIEW
In this section, we introduce the threat model and the spe-
cific hardware information obtained during execution.
3.1 Attack Model
We focus on the edge security in this work. As shown in
Figure 2, the attacker can physically access one edge device
encapsulating a victim DNN model for model extraction and
attack all the other devices which share the same neural net-
work model. We assume that the adversary use bus snooping
techniques which passively monitor PCIe and memory bus
events. Bus snooping is a well understood, practical, and
low-cost attack that has been widely demonstrated [27–29].
We do not assume that the attacker has any access to the data
passing through through buses, only the addresses, and the
attacks described here can work even when data is encrypted.
We make no assumptions with regard the ability of the at-
tacker to know even what family of DNN models might be
running, what software codes might implement those mod-
els, or have any other information about the operation of the
device under attack that is not directly exposed through ex-
ternally accessible connections. The model extraction parts
of the attack are fully passive requiring only the ability to
observe architectural side channels over time. To complete
the attack and craft adversarial inputs, the ability to provide
specific inputs and observe results is also required.
3.2 Target Hardware Platform
To make the attack more concrete, we specifically consider
Snooped Bus Info
Device 
Memory
CPU GPU
PCIE GDDR5
(a)
Model
Attacker
Hardware Platform
Network Architecture of the Victim model
(b)
Figure 2: Illustration of the attack model. (a) Hack-one,
Attack-All-Others. (b). Bus snooping at GPU platform.
a heterogeneous CPU-GPU platform. The basic infrastruc-
ture [30] is shown in Figure 2.(b). The CPU and GPU are
connected by the PCIE bus, and the host and device mem-
ories are attached to the CPU and GPU through DDR and
GDDR memory buses, respectively. Such a design offers
good programmability, generality, high performance, and
hence is a representative platform for such attacks. Many
real industrial products are built around such an architecture
including most of the existing L3 autopilot systems [11, 12].
The adversary can get access to the PCIe and GDDR bus for
model extraction [27–29], either by physical probing at the
interconnect [27] or applying a DMA capable device [28].
3.3 Architecture Information Leakage
Table 1 lists the information we can get from the PCIe bus
and device memory bus.
Table 1: Bus snooped information.
Obtained Inferred
PCIe Bus Kernel events; ExeLat
Mem copy size (Memcp)
Device Memory Bus Memory request trace Rv, Wv, dRAW
3.3.1 Information Leakage Through PCIe Bus.
Obtained Information: According to the GPU programming
model, the CPU transfers data from the host memory to the
device memory and then launches GPU kernels for execution.
Once the GPU finishes the task, it transfers results back to
the host memory. Thus, there are copy events or control
messages through the PCIe bus before the kernel launching
and completion during the CUDA program execution [31].
The attacker can obtain two kinds of information: the kernel
events and the memory copy size (Memcp) between CPU
and GPU.
Inferred Information: From the data above we can infer the
kernel duration time (Exelat ) from the kernel events.
3.3.2 Information Leakage Through Memory Bus.
Obtained Information: During the process of memory bus
snooping, the memory access type (read or write), address,
and a time stamp for each access can be obtained [29].
Inferred Information: According to the time stamp of mem-
ory requests and the kernel execution period, we can infer the
following architectural execution characteristics. (1) Read
and write data volume (Rv and Wv) of the memory requests in
every kernel. (2) The data reuse kernel distance according to
the addresses and types of memory requests. Specifically, we
focus on reuse distance in the kernel wise of the Read after
Write (RAW) pattern which is referred to as dRAW .
3
4. NETWORK ARCHITECTURE EXTRAC-
TION
At a high level, the goal of the proposed methodology is
to leverage the hardware snooped information to extract the
network architecture of victim model, including the set of
layers employed, the connections between layers, and their
respective dimension size. This reverse engineering goes
through multiple layers of the DNN system stack, including
framework, primitive, and hardware platform. As shown in
Figure 3.(a), the frameworks optimize the network architec-
ture to form the framework-level layer computational graph
and transform these high-level abstractions to hardware prim-
itives (cuDNN, OpenCL) for better resource utilization. The
cuDNN library [32] launches the well-optimized handcraft
kernel sequence according to the layer type. Finally, kernel
execution on the hardware platform exhibits architecture fea-
tures, including the memory access pattern and the kernel
execution latency.
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Figure 3: (a). DNN system stack. (b)Three-step method-
ology for network architecture extraction .
There are several challenges to achieving the goal of ex-
tracting network architecture based on kernel execution fea-
ture sequences: 1) The relationship between layer and kernel
is not static one-to-one correspondence relationship. For ex-
ample, single conv layer may be implemented as 10x-100x
different kernels and in 7 different implementations during
run-time. Therefore accurately identify the layer sequence
based on the execution statistics of very long kernel sequence
(10x 1000x) is an important and challenging task. 1) Some
kernels belonging to different layers have quite similar ar-
chitectural execution features, such as BN, ReLU, and some
kernels from Conv. 2) Memory hierarchy and programming
library optimization increase the variations of the architecture
events, which introduces the run-time noises into the kernel
execution features. For example, the cuDNN [32] library
greatly optimizes the convolution and matrix-vector multipli-
cation. There are seven different algorithm implementations
for the Conv layer, which are selected during running time,
aiming at fully leveraging the compute capability of GPU
resources for better performance. Hence, the Conv layers
produce variable numbers of execution kernels with differ-
ent features. Overall, these architectural and system designs
introduce noises that lower the identification accuracy for
recovering the DNN network structure.
To address these issues, we propose a methodology which
employs both architecture execution features and inter-layer
context probability of building DNN models. The overall
process consists of three steps: 1) Run-time layer sequence
identification; 2) Layer topology reconstruction; and 3) Di-
mension size estimation, as shown in Figure 3.(b). The three
steps of performing the model extract then are as follows:
4.1 Run-time Layer Sequence Identification
In this step, the attacker identifies the executed layers dur-
ing running time according to the kernel execution features.
We first analyze the characteristics of different layers. We
identify that both the kernel execution features and layer con-
text features are important for run-time layer sequence identi-
fication. We then ingeniously formalize the layer sequence
identification as a sequence-to-sequence problem. At the end,
we leverage a speech recognition approach [33] as a tool to
solve this problem, which achieves accurate prediction.
After comprehensively investigating modern DNN models,
we consider the following layers in this work: Conv (convolu-
tion), FC (fully-connected), BN (batch normalization), ReLU
(rectified linear unit), Pool, Add, and Concat, because most
of the state-of-art neural network architectures can be repre-
sented by these basic layers [2,23,34–37]. Note that it is easy
to integrate other layers into this methodology if necessary.
Every layer conducts a certain operation for the input data
and output results to the next layer(s). They have following
functionality: 1) Conv and FC implement linear transfor-
mations on the input or activation data. 2) ReLU performs
nonlinear transformations on the input activation, which has
equal input and output data volumes. 3) BN performs nor-
malization (e.g. scaling and shifting) on the input activation
for faster convergence and also has equal input and output
volumes. 4) Pool aggregates features by down-sampling the
input activation for dimension reduction. 5) Add performs
element-wise addition on two input activation tensors. 6)
Concat concatenates several sub-input tensors into a single
output tensor [34]. To identify which layer the kernels belong
to, we first analyze the characteristics of these layers in terms
of both architectural behavior and model design principle.
4.1.1 Layer Characterization
Intra-Layer Architectural Characterization. We highlight
the following architectural features of kernels for analysis:
1) kernel duration time (ExeLat); 2) the read volume Rv and
write volume Wv through memory bus during kernel execu-
tion; 3) input/output data volume ratio (Iv/Ov) where the
output volume (Ov) equals to the write volume of this kernel
and input volume (Iv) equals the write volume of the previous
executed kernel; 4) kernel dependency distance (kdd), repre-
sents the maximum distance in the kernel sequence among
current execution kernel and the previous dependent kernels,
which can be calculated as follows: kdd ≈ max(dRAW ).
We observe that although the kernels of different layers
have their own features according to their functionality, it
is still challenging to predict which layer a kernel belongs
to, just based on the these execution features. As shown in
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Figure 4, every point represents the multi-dimensional infor-
mation (Exelat , Rv/Wv, Iv/Ov) of an execution kernel. We
observe that many points in Figure 4 are close to each other
which are difficult for identification. Our experiments show
that about 30% of kernels are identified incorrectly with the
executed features only and this error rate will increase drasti-
cally with more complex network architectures. The detail
of the experiments results are shown in Section 6.2.2. In
summary, the pre-mentioned factors will lower the predic-
tion accuracy for recovering the DNN structure if we only
consider the single layer independently.
Figure 4: Kernal features of layers.
DNN Inter-Layer Context. Given the previous layer, there
is a non-uniform likelihood for the following layer type. This
phenomenon provides the opportunity to achieve better layer
identification. For example, there is a small likelihood that
a FC layer follows a Conv layer in DNN models, because
it does not make sense to have two consecutive linear trans-
formation layers. Such temporal association information
between layers (aka. layer context) are inherently brought
by the DNN model design philosophy. Recalling the de-
sign philosophy of some typical NN models, e.g. VGG [2],
ResNet [23], GoogleNet [34], and DenseNet [22], there are
some common empirical evidences in building network ar-
chitecture: 1) the architecture consists of several basic blocks
iteratively connected. 2) the basic blocks usually include
linear operation first (Conv, FC), possibly following normal-
ization to improve the convergence (BN), then non-linear
transformation (ReLU), possible down-sampling of the fea-
ture map (Pool), and possible tensor reduction or merge (Add,
Concat).
Although DNN architectures evolve rapidly, the basic de-
sign philosophy remains the same. Furthermore, the state-
of-the-art technical direction of Neural Architecture Search
(NAS), which uses reinforcement learning search method to
optimize network architecture, also follows the similar empir-
ical experience [36]. Therefore such layer context generally
happens in the network architecture design, which can be
used as the prior knowledge for layer identification.
4.1.2 Run-time Layer Sequence Prediction.
Based on the above analysis, two major sources of infor-
mation are jointly considered in layer prediction: the ar-
chitectural kernel execution features and the layer context
distribution possibilities in the layer sequence. This problem
is similar to the speech recognition, as shown in Figure 5,
which also involves two parts: the acoustic model convert-
ing acoustic signals to text and language models computing
text probabilistic distribution in words. Therefore we inge-
niously map the run-time layer sequence prediction onto a
speech recognition problem and use ASR (auto speech recog-
nition) technologies [33, 38] as a tool to implement the layer
identification.
Formally, the run-time layer sequence prediction problem
can be described as follows: We have the kernel execution
feature sequence ~X with temporal length of T as an input.
At each time step, kernel feature ~Xt (0 ≤ t < T ) can be de-
scribed as a six-dimension tuple: (Exelat , Rv, Wv, Rv/Wv,
Iv/Wv, kdd)t . The label space L is a set of sequences com-
prised of all typical layers. The goal is to train an layer
sequence identifier h to identify the input kernel feature se-
quence in a way that minimizes the distance between the
predicted layer sequence (Y ) and oracle sequence (L).
Context-aware Layer Sequence Identification. To build
the classifier h, we adopt the LSTM model (a typical re-
current neural network) with CTC (Connectionist Temporal
Classification) decoder, which is commonly used in Auto-
matic Speech Recognition [33, 38]. As shown in Figure 5,
given the input sequence (~X1, .., ~XT ), the output vector ~Yt is
normalized by the softmax operation and transformed to a
probability distribution of the next layer OP. The object func-
tion of training is defined to minimize the CTC cost for a
given target layer sequence L∗.
CTC(X) =−logP(L∗|X) (1)
where P(L∗|X) denotes the total probability of an emission
result L∗ in the presence of X .
Taking a simplified example in Figure 5.(b), there is a se-
quence within 3 execution kernels. At every time step in
(t0, t1, and t2), the LSTM outputs the probability distribution
of the layer OPs. At the final time step, the CTC decoder
uses beam search to find out the sequence with the highest
possibility. In Figure 5.(b), the number above an extending
node is the total probability of all labelings beginning with
this layer OP as the layer sequence prefix. Taking the ‘BN’
at the second row for example, the possibility of sequences
with ’BN’ as the prefix is 0.5. At every iteration, the ex-
tensions of the most probable remaining prefix are explored.
Searching ends when a single labeling is more probable than
any remaining prefix. In this example, ‘Conv, BN, ReLU’ is
the sequence after CTC beam search, which is taken as the
prediction result.
At the end of this step, we can get the run-time layer se-
quence according to the extracted features of the GPU kernel
sequence. The experimental details of the model training,
validation, and testing are explained in Section 6.
4.2 Layer Topology Reconstruction
After obtaining the predicted run-time layer sequence, the
next step is to get the connectivity between layers to recon-
struct the layer topology. If the feature map data of layer
a is fed as the input of layer b, there should be a directed
topology connection from a to b. Since this work focuses on
the inference stage, there is only forward propagation across
the whole network architecture.
We first analyze the cache behaviors of feature map data
and have the following observations:
Observation-1: Only feature map data (activation data) in-
troduces RAW memory access pattern in the memory bus.
There are several types of data throughout the DNN inference:
input images, parameters, and feature map data. Only feature
map data is updated during inference. Feature map data will
be written to memory hierachy and be read as the input data
of the next layer. The input image and parameter data will not
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Figure 5: Context-aware layer sequence identification. (a). Map the layer sequence identification to speech recognition
problem; (b) An example of layer sequence identification.
be updated during the whole inference procedure. Therefore
the RAW memory access pattern will not be introduced by
the input image and parameter data, but only by the feature
map data.
Observation-2: There is very high possibility for the feature
map data to introduce read cache misses, especially for the
convergent and divergent layers. 1) Convergent layer is the
one that receives feature map data from several layers. Add
and Concat, the main convergent layers, introduce many read
cache misses that are contributed by the feature map since
they only read the feature map data). As shown in Figure
6, the read cache-miss rate of Add layer is more than 98%
and Concat is more than 50%. 2) Divergent layer is the one
that output feature map data to several successor layers on
different branches. We observe that GPU kernels will execute
the layers in one branch before another. Therefore there
is a very long distance between this divergent layer and its
successor layers in the run-time layer sequence. Because the
CUDA library implements extreme data reuse optimization
that allocates more cache capacity to the weight tensor instead
of the feature map data, it is highly possible that the feature
map will be flushed out and need to be read again because of
a long reuse distance.
Based on these two observations, we are able to reconstruct
the layer connection by detecting the RAW access patterns in
different layers. We propose a layer topology reconstruction
algorithm as follows: Step-1: We scan the memory request
address for every layer in the run-time layer sequence. We
add the a connection if there is a successor layer reads the
same address with the write address of this layer. Step-2: If
there is a non-end layer without any successor, we add the
connection between the layer and it next layer in the layer
sequence.
4.3 Dimension Size Estimation
After the above two steps, we construct the layer topol-
ogy without the dimension size information. In this section,
we explain how to estimate the dimension size parameters
according to the memory read and write volume.
4.3.1 Layer Input/Output Data Volume Estimation
In the first stage, we estimate the input and output size of
every layer starting from ReLU layers.
Step-1: ReLU input/output size estimation. As character-
ized in the previous subsection, ReLU and Add have high
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Figure 6: Read cache-miss rate of layers in VGG11,
ResNet18, and Inception.
cache miss rate, surpassing 98%. Hence, the read volume
through the bus Rv is almost the same as the input feature
map size of the DNN model. Then the write volume Wv can
be estimated which is equal to Rv. Based on this observation,
we can obtain the input and output size of ReLU layers.
Step-2: Broadcasting ReLU size to other layers. In neural
network, the previous layer’s output acts as the input to cur-
rent layer, so the output size (feature map height/width and
channel number for Conv or neuron number for FC) of the
previous layer equals to the input size of current layer. Hence,
given the input size of a ReLU layer, the output size of the
previous BN/Add/Conv/FC layer and the input size of the
next Conv/FC layer can be estimated. Since the ReLU layer
is almost a standard layer every basic blocks, it can guide the
dimension size estimation of its adjacent layers. The Add
layer can play a similar role for dimension estimation at the
divergence and convergence points of compute branches.
Step-3: Estimate the DNN input and output size. In this
step, we estimate the input size of the first layer and output
size of the last layer with the PCIe information. As described
in Section 3.3.1, the adversary is able to get the memory copy
size through PCIe. The input image data is copied to GPU
at the beginning and prediction results data is copied to host
at the end of a batch inference. Therefore the input size and
output size can be inferred from Memcp.
4.3.2 Dimension Space Calculation
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In the second stage, we calculate the dimension param-
eters with the constructed the layer topology knowing the
input/output size of every layer ( Ii/Oi). We want to estimate
the following dimension space: the input (output) channel
size ICi (OCi), the input (output) height IHi (OHi), the input
(output) width IWi (OWi), the the weight size (K×K), and the
convolution padding P and stride S. In fully connected layers,
OC denotes the neuron number. The quantitative estimation
is listed in Table 2. Based on the fact that the input size of
each layer keep the same as the output size of previous layer,
and following the constraints shown in Table 2, we are able
to search the possible solutions for every layer.
Table 2: Dimension space calculation.
Layer OP Constraints & Estimation
Conv
OHi = b(IHi +2P−K)/Sc+1
OWi = b(IWi +2P−K)/Sc+1
OHi×OWi×OCi = Oi/N
Pool
OHi = b(IHi +2P−K)/Sc+1
OWi = b(IWi +2P−K)/Sc+1
OCi = ICi, OHi×OWi×OCi = Oi/N
FC OCi = Oi/N
BN OHI = IHi, OWI = IWi, OCi = ICi
ReLU OHI = IHi, OWI = IWi, OCi = ICi
Add OHi = IHi j , OWi = IWi j , OCi = ICi j
Concat OHi = IHi j , OWi = IWi j , OCi = ∑ j ICi j
5. FUTHER-STEP ADVERSARIAL ATTACK
The extracted network architecture can be used to conduct
further-step attack. In this work, we use the adversarial attack
as a use case to show the importance of network architecture,
which is also one of the most common attack means in the
domain of neural network security.
In the adversarial attack, the adversaries manipulate the
output of the neural network model by inserting small pertur-
bations to the input images that still remain almost impercep-
tible to human vision [20]. The goal of adversarial attack is
to search the minimum perturbation on input that can mislead
the model to produce an arbitrary (untargeted attack) [20]
or a pre-assigned (targeted attack) [39–41] incorrect output.
To conduct the adversarial attack against a black-box model,
the adversary normally builds a substitute model first, by
querying the input and output of the victim model. Then
the adversary generates the adversarial examples based on
the white-box substitute model [39, 42, 43]. Finally, they use
these adversarial examples to attack the black-box model.
Step-1: Build substitute models In our work, we train sub-
stitute models with the extracted network architectures, while
previous work select the typical network architectures to build
the substitute model, as shown in Figure 7 .
Step-2: Generate adversarial examples The state-of-art so-
lution [18] uses ensembled method to improve the attacking
successful rate based on the hypothesis that if an adversarial
image remains adversarial for multiple models, it is more
likely to be effective against the black-box model as well. We
follow the similar techniques to generate adversarial images
for the ensemble of multiple models.
Step-3: Apply the adversarial examples As the final step,
the adversary attacks the black-box model using the generated
adversarial examples as input.
Substitute Candidates
Victim 
Black-box Model
Adversarial Example
Generation
Substitute
Model 3
Baseline 
Existing model zoo:  Inception,
VGG/ResNet/Densenet Family…
Extracted network architectures
❷❸
Substitute
Model 4
Substitute
Model 1
Substitute
Model 2
Network 
Arch
Ensemble
Our work 
Adversarial
Examples
❶
Figure 7: Adversarial Attack Flow.
We follow the same adversarial attack methodology in the
previous work [18] and the only difference is that we use the
predicted network architecture to build the substitute models
and the experiments show that with the accurate extracted
network architecture, the successful rate of adversarial attack
will be improved significantly. The detailed results will be
shown in Section 6.4.2.
6. ATTACK DEMONSTRATION
In this section, we evaluate a complete hacking flow, taking
CNNs as a case study.
6.1 Evaluation Methodology
Experimental Platform: To validate the feasibility of steal-
ing the memory information during inference execution, we
conduct the experiments on the hardware platform equipped
with Nvidia K40 GPU [44]. The NN models are implemented
based on Pytorch framework [45], with CUDA8.0 [46] and
cuDNN optimization library [32].
Experimental Setup: We use the nvprof tool to emulate bus
snooping. nvprof is an NVIDIA profiling tool kit that enables
us to understand and optimize the performance of OpenACC
applications [47]. The information that we can get from the
nvprof tool is shown in Table 1. Based on these raw data, we
can reconstruct the network architecture of the victim model
according to the steps in Figure 3.(b).
Layer Sequence Identifier Training: As an initial step for
network architecture extraction, we first train the layer se-
quence identifier based on an LSTM-CTC model for layer
sequence identification. The detailed training procedure is as
follows.
Dataset for Training: In order to prepare the training data,
we first generate 8500 random computational graphs and ob-
tain the kernel features experimentally with nvprof which
emulates the process of bus snooping. Two kinds of ran-
domness are considered during random graph generation:
topological randomness and dimensional randomness. At
every step, the generator randomly selects one type of block
from sequential, Add, and Concat blocks. The sequential
block candidates include (Conv, ReLU), (FC, ReLU), and
(Conv, ReLU, Pool) with or without BN. The FC layer only
occurs when the feature map size is smaller than a threshold.
The Add block is randomly built based on the sequential
blocks with shortcut connection. The Concat block is built
with randomly generated subtrack number, possibly within
Add blocks and sequential blocks. The dimensional size pa-
rameters, such as the channel, stride, padding, and weight
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size of Conv and neuron size of FC layer, are randomly gen-
erated to improve the diversity of the random graphs. The
input size of the first layer and the output size of the last layer
are fixed during random graph generation, considering that
they are usually fixed in one specific target platform. We
randomly select 80% of the random graphs as the training
set and other 20% as the validation set to validate whether
the training is overfitting or not. To verify the effectiveness
and generalization of our hardware-aided framework, we ex-
amine various NN models as the test set, including VGG [2],
ResNet [23], Inception [34], and Nasnet [36] to cover the
layer types as many as possible.
Identifier Configurations: The identifier utilizes the LSTM-
CTC model, consisting of one hidden layer with 128 cells,
for layer sequence identification. It is trained using the Adam
[48] optimizer with learning rate adaptation. The training is
terminated after 100 epochs.
6.2 Run-Time Layer Sequence Identification
In this section, we first evaluate the layer sequence iden-
tification accuracy. Then we analyze the importance of the
layer context information and how does the noise affect the
identification accuracy.
6.2.1 Prediction Accuracy
Evaluation Metric. The speech recognition model adopts
the mean normalized edit distance between the predicted
sequence and label sequence to quantify the prediction accu-
racy [33, 38], which is referred to as label error rate (LER).
Therefore, here we also adopt LER to evaluate the prediction
accuracy. The detailed LER calculation is formulated as the
following equation [33].
LER =
1
|S| ∑
(x,z)∈S
ED(h(x),z)
|z| (2)
where ED(p,q) is the edit distance between two sequences p
and q, i.e. the minimum number of insertions, substitutions,
and deletions required to change p into q, |S| is the number
of samples in testing set, h(x) is the identified layer sequence,
and z is the oracle layer sequence.
Results. We first evaluate the accuracy on validation set.
The average LER on validation set is about 0.08, which ev-
idences the good prediction capability. Furthermore, we
evaluate the accuracy to identify several typical networks,
as shown in Table 3. For VGG and ResNet families, the
prediction LER is lower than 0.07. For inception and Nasnet,
the LER increases a little bit because of the much deeper
and complex topology. In summary, our proposed method
predicts generally well in these cases.
A Detailed Example. We take ResNet34 as an example to
present the detailed results in Table 4. We make the following
observations: 1) The prediction model is generally effective
in correctly identifying the layer sequence; 2) In some rare
cases, although it is possible that the BN/ReLU will be in-
correctly missed or created, the critical Conv/FC/Add/Concat
layers can be correctly recognized.
6.2.2 With/Without Layer Context Information.
We analyze the importance of inter-layer information in
Table 3: Prediction LER on typical networks.
VGG16 VGG19 ResNet34 ResNet101 ResNet152 Inception Nasnet_large
0.020 0.017 0.040 0.067 0.068 0.117 0.132
Table 4: Detailed comparison between the oracle and pre-
dicted layer sequence.
Network Oracle Sequence Predicted Sequence
ResNet34
(LER
0.040)
conv bn relu pool conv bn relu
conv bn add relu conv bn relu
conv bn add relu conv bn relu
conv bn add relu conv bn relu
conv bn conv bn add relu conv
bn relu conv bn add relu conv
bn relu conv bn add relu conv
bn relu conv bn add relu conv
bn relu conv bn conv bn add
relu conv bn relu conv bn add
relu conv bn relu conv bn add
relu conv bn relu conv bn add
relu conv bn relu conv bn add
relu conv bn relu conv bn add
relu conv bn relu conv bn conv
bn add relu conv bn relu conv
bn add relu conv bn relu conv
bn add relu pool fc
conv bn relu pool conv bn relu
conv bn add relu conv bn relu
conv bn add relu conv bn relu
conv bn add relu conv bn relu
conv bn conv bn add relu conv
bn relu conv bn add relu conv
bn relu conv bn add relu conv
bn relu conv bn add relu conv
bn relu conv bn conv bn add
relu conv bn relu conv bn add
relu conv bn relu conv bn add
relu conv bn relu conv bn add
relu conv bn relu conv bn add
relu conv bn relu conv bn add
relu conv bn relu conv bn conv
bn add relu conv bn relu conv
bn relu add relu conv bn relu
conv bn relu add relu pool fc
this section. As shown in Figure 8(a), we compare the LER of
two methods: layer-context-aware identifier based on LSTM-
CTC model and single-layer identifier based on MLP (multi-
layered perceptron) model.
We draw two conclusions from this experiment: 1) We can
achieve much better prediction accuracy with considering the
layer context information. The results show that the average
LER of LSTM-CTC is two times lower than the MLP-based
method. 2) Layer context information is increasingly impor-
tant when identifying more complex network architecture.
As shown in Figure 8.(b), compared to the simple network
architecture with only chain typologies, the more complex
architectures with remote connections (e.g. Add or Concat)
cause higher error rates. For the MLP-based model, the LER
dramatically increases when the network is more complex
(from 0.18 to 0.5); while for the LSTM-CTC model, the aver-
age LER demonstrates a non-significant increase (from 0.065
to 0.104).
A
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Sequential Add Concat
MLP LSTM-CTC
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(a) (b)
Figure 8: MLP: layer prediction without inter-layer in-
formation; LSTM-CTC: leverage the inter-layer infor-
mation for better prediction. The results indicate that
the inter-layer likelihood is very important for layer pre-
diction.
The experiments results indicate that the layer context with
inter-layer temporal association is a very important informa-
tion source, especially for the layer sequence within complex
topology.
6.2.3 Noise Influence.
We conduct experiments to analyze the prediction sensitiv-
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ity in the scenarios with noise on the kernel features. When
5%, 10%, 20%, or 30% of random noises is inserted to the
read and write volumes of the validation set, the average
LERs of the layer prediction is shown in Table 5. The results
indicate that the layer sequence identifier has the ability to
resist noise.
Table 5: Prediction LER on validation set with random
noise.
Noise 5% 10% 15% 30%
LER 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.16
Figure 9: Layer input and output size estimation (nor-
malized to the oracle size).
6.3 Dimension Space Estimation
In this section, we show how accurate the size estimation
of the input and output for every layer can be, which is impor-
tant for dimension space estimation. We take the input and
output size of every layer as examples and show the results
in Figure 9. The estimated size is normalized to the oracle
size. For Conv, BN, ReLU, Add, and Concat, the estima-
tion accuracy can reach up to 98%. The FC presents lower
accuracy, because of the following reasons: the FC layer is
usually at the end of the network and the neuron number
shrinks. Therefore, the activation data of the ReLU layer will
probably be filtered, and the corresponding cache miss rate
will be much lower. Therefore, it is not accurate to use ReLU
read transactions to estimate the FC size. Instead, we use the
read volume of FC layer to predict the input and output size.
6.4 An end-to-end Demo Case
We use a complete example to clearly illustrate the model
extraction against the victic model ResNet18. With the ex-
tracted network architecture, we conduct the consequent ad-
versarial attack which shows that the attack success rate can
be significantly improved.
6.4.1 Model Extraction
The model extraction flow is shown in Figure 10, consist-
ing the following four steps.
Step-1: Kernel feature calculation: 1) We obtain the bus
snooped information and calculate the sequence of kernel fea-
tures (ExeLat , Rv, Wv, Rv/Wv, In/Out), as shown in Subgraph-
1 .
Step-2: Run-time layer sequence identification: Taking in
the kernel feature sequence, we use the layer sequence iden-
tifier, which is based on an LSTM-CTC model, to identify
the layer sequence. The prediction results are listed in the
right boxes of Subgraph- 2 . Because the network architecture
usually constitutes of several basic blocks iteratively, we use
a hierarchical expression to show the prediction results to
facilitate the presentation. The complete layer sequence of
ResNet18 consists of {B0,B1,B1,B2,B1,B2,B1,B2,B3,F1}.
The identifier predicts the layer sequence precisely for most
of the blocks and there are only small mistakes in two blocks:
In B0, the identifier missed a BN layer; In B3, the identifier in-
correctly adds another ReLU in the architecture. Since there
is no change to the feature map size in BN and ReLU layers,
this prediction will not affect the dimension size estimation
results.
Step-3: Layer topology reconstruction: Based on the RAW
memory access dependency pattern, the layer topology is
constructed following the reconstruction algorithm, as shown
in Subgraph- 3 .
Step-4: Dimension size estimation: 1) We first estimate the
feature map input and output size of ReLU layers accord-
ing to their read and write volume (in blue color); 2) We
then estimate the input and output size of all the other layers
propagating from ReLU; 3) We finally estimate the complete
dimension space based on the input and output size of lay-
ers, according to the equations in Table 2. With reasonably
assuming the kernel and stride size, the padding, input chan-
nel, output channel in each Conv Layer can be consequently
derived.
Two examples of the possible dimension solutions are
shown in Subgraph- 4 . ‘[]’ represents a basic block with
an Add layer; ‘K’, ‘P’, and ‘S’ represent the weight, the
padding, and the stride size of the Conv layer, respectively;
‘B’ represents BN; and ‘R’ represents ReLU.
We successfully reconstructed the network architecture of
the black-box DNN model after these four steps. Although
the final graph is not unique due to the variable dimension
size, they are within the same network architecture family.
We will show the importance of these predicted network
architectures which can help boost the adversarial attacking
efficiency in the following subsection.
6.4.2 Adversarial Attack Efficiency
In this section, we show that the adversarial attack ef-
ficiency can be significantly improved with the extracted
network architecture information.
The adversarial attacking flow consists of three steps: 1)
building substitute models; 2) generating adversarial exam-
ples towards the substitute model; 3) applying the adversarial
examples to the victim black-box model, as introduced in
Section 5. We use the algorithm proposed in prior work [18],
which achieves better attacking success rate by generating the
adversarial examples based on the ensemble of four substitute
models.
Setup: In these experiments, we use ResNet18 [23] as the vic-
tim model for targeted attack. Our work adopts the extracted
neural network architecture, as shown in Figure 10, to build
the substitute models. For comparison, the baseline examines
the substitute models established from following networks:
VGG family (VGG11, VGG13, VGG16, VGG19) [2], ResNet fam-
ily (ResNet34, ResNet50, ResNet101, ResNet152) [23],
DenseNet family (DenseNet121, DenseNet161, DenseNet169,
DenseNet201) [22], SqueezeNet [49], and Inception [34].
Results: First, we randomly select 10 classes, each class
with 100 images from ImageNet dataset [50] for testing. To
perform the targeted attack, we test both the cases that the
targeted class is far away from the original class and the
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Figure 10: Illustration of a complete example of reconstructing ResNet18. Step-1: Calculating the kernel features
based on the bus snooped information (emulated by nvprof); Step-2: Identify the run-time layer sequence; Step-3:
Reconstruct the layer topology and get the input and output size of layers; Step-4: dimension estimation according to
the layer type and input/output size.
targeted class is close to original class. We compare the
following five solutions: ensembled model with substitute
models from VGG family, DenseNet family, mix architec-
tures (squeezeNet, inception, AlexNet, DenseNet), ResNet
family, and from extracted ResNet architectures using our
previous model extraction. The results are shown in Table 6.
We get several observations: 1) The attacking success rate
is generally low for the cases without network architecture
knowledge. The adversarial examples generated by substitute
model with VGG family, DenseNet family, and mix architec-
tures only conduct successful attacks in 14%–25.5% of the
cases. 2) With some knowledge of the victim architecture,
the attacking success rate can be significantly improved. For
example, the substitute models within ResNet family can
achieve attack success rate of 43%. 3) With accurate network
extraction, although it still has a little difference from the
original network, the attacking efficiency can be boosted to
75.9%. These results indicate that our model extraction can
significantly improve the success rate of consequent adver-
sarial attacks.
In a further step, we take a deep look at the targeted attack
leading the images in Class-755 to be misclassified as Class-
255, in order to explore the ensembled model with various
substitute combinations. We randomly pick four substitute
models from the candidate model zoo and the results are
shown in the blue bars of Figure 11. We also compare the
results to the cases using substitute models 1) from VGG
family; 2) from DenseNet family; 3) from squeezeNet, in-
ception, AlexNet, and DenseNet (’Mix’ bar in the figure); 4)
from ResNet family; and 4) from extracted cognate ResNet18
model (Our method) to generate the adversarial examples. As
shown in Figure 11, the average success rate of random cases
is only 17% and the best random-picking case just achieves
the attacking success rate of 34%. We observe that all good
cases in random-picking (attacking success rate > 20%) in-
clude substitute models from ResNet family. Our method
with accurate extracted DNN models performs best attacking
success rate across all the cases, 40% larger than the best
random-picking case and ResNet family cases. In a nutshell,
with the help of the effective and accurate model extraction,
the consequent adversarial attack can achieve much better
attack success rate.
Table 6: Success rate with different substitute models.
VGG DenseNet Mix ResNet Extracted
family family family DNN
Success rate 18.1% 25.5% 14.6% 43% 75.9%
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Figure 11: Explore attack success rate across different
cases when conduct targeted attack (Class-750→ Class-
255): 1) random picking 4 subsitute modes from candi-
date pool; 2) substitute models from VGG family; 3) sub-
stitute models from DenseNet family; 4) substitute mod-
els from squeezeNet, inception, AlexNet, and DenseNet
(Mix); 5) substitute models from ResNet family ; 6) sub-
stitute models from our extracted network architectures.
7. DISCUSSION
In this section, we first analyze the intrinsic reason of
successful network architecture extraction and how general it
will work. Then, we further explain the impact of the existing
memory bus protection methods on our attacking approach
and propose potential defensive techniques.
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7.1 Generality and Insights
The standardization through the whole stack of neural net-
work system facilitates the model extraction. The standard-
ized hardware platforms, drivers, libraries, and frameworks
are developed to help machine learning industrialization with
user-friendly interfaces. Transforming from the input neu-
ral network architecture to final hardware code is dependent
on the compilation and scheduling strategies of DNN sys-
tem stacks, which can be learned under the same execution
environment. Therefore, the adoption of these hardwares,
frameworks, and libraries in the development workflow gives
attackers an opportunity to investigate the execution pattern
and reconstruct the network architecture based on the hard-
ware execution information.
The root cause of hacking the network structure is to learn
the transformations between framework-level computation
graphs and kernel feature sequence. Therefore, we build the
training set based on random graphs with basic operations
provided by DNN framework. In our methodology, as long as
the DNN model is built based on the basic operations provide
by framework (such as Conv2d, ReLU, and MaxPool2d, etc
in pytorch), the neural network structure can be reconstructed.
In addition, our methodology can be extended to include the
other operations in the framework model zoo. Therefore, our
methodology is generally applicable to various CNN models
with different neural network architectures. We demonstrate
that memory address traces are able to damage the NN system
security which urges hardware security studies(e.g.ORAM)
and may raise the attention of the architecture/system com-
munity to build more robust NN system stack.
7.2 Defence Strategies
7.2.1 Microarchitecture Methodologies.
There are a few architectural memory protection meth-
ods. Oblivious Memory: To reduce the information leak-
age on the bus, previous work proposes oblivious RAM
(ORAM) [51–53], which hides the memory access pattern
by encrypting the data addresses. With ORAM, attackers
cannot identify two operations even when they are accessing
the same physical address [51]. However, ORAM techniques
incur a significant memory bandwidth overhead (up to an
astonishing 10x), which is impractical to be used on GPU
architecture that is bandwidth sensitive.
Dummy Read/Write Operations: Another possible defence
solution is to introduce fake memory traffic to disturb the
statistics of memory events. Unfortunately the noise exerts
only a small degradation of the layer sequence prediction ac-
curacy, as illustrated in Section 6.2.3. As such, dummy RAW
operations to obfuscate the layer dependencies identification
may be a more fruitful defensive technique to explore.
7.2.2 System Methodologies.
The essence of our work is to learn the compilation and
scheduling graphs of the system stack. Although the com-
putational graphs go through multiple levels of the system
stack, we demonstrate that it is still possible to recover the
original computational graph based on the raw information
stolen from the hardware. At the system level one could: 1)
customize the overall NN system stack with TVM, which is
able to implement the graph level optimization for the op-
erations and the data layout [54]. The internal optimization
possibly increases the difficulty for the attackers to learn the
scheduling and compilation graph, or 2) make secure-oriented
scheduling between different batches during the front-end
graph optimization. Although such optimizations may have
little impact on performance, they may obfuscate the attackers
view of kernel information.
8. RELATED WORK
Machine learning security is an attractive topic with the
industrialization of DNNs techniques. The related existing
work mainly comes from the following two aspects.
Algorithm perspective: Neural network security attracts
much attention with the industrialization of the DNN tech-
niques. Previous work discuss the concrete AI security prob-
lems and machine learning attack approaches [13, 16, 55].
Adversarial attacking are one of the most important attack
model which generates the adversarial examples with in-
visible perturbation to confuse the victim model for wrong
decision. These adversarial examples can produce either the
targeted [20, 39, 56–61], or untargeted [41, 62–65] output
for further malicious actions. The adversarial attacks can
be categorized as white-box attacks [20, 39–41, 56, 66–71]
and black-box attacks [20, 25, 39, 41–43, 60, 61, 65, 72–79],
according to the prior knowledge regarding the victim model.
More specifically, in white-box attack, attacker knows in-
ternal model characteristics (i.e. network architecture and
parameter of the model) of the victim model. White-box at-
tack is less practical than black-box attack in real deployment
since the designers intend to hind the information from the
users. In black-box attack, the attacker has no knowledge of
the model characteristics but can only query the black-box
model for the input and output responses. The state-of-art
work observes that adversarial examples transfer better if the
substitute and victim model are in the same network architec-
ture family [18, 19]. Therefore, the extracting inner network
structure is important for attacking effectiveness.
Consequently, model extraction work are emerged to ex-
plore the model characteristics. Previous work steal the pa-
rameter and hyperparameter of DNN models with the basic
knowledge of NN architecture [25, 26]. Seong et al. explore
the internal information of the victim model based on meta-
learning [19]. However, it is inefficient to extract the neural
network architecture in the algorithm level, Our work ad-
dresses this issue from system perspective with enhancement
of bus snooped information, which will significantly benefit
the attack efficiency of current software algorithms.
Hardware perspective: Several accelerator based attacks
are proposed, either aiming to conduct model extraction [24]
or input inversion [80]. However, their methodology relies
on the specific features in hardware platforms and cannot
be generally applicable to GPU platforms with full system
stack. Some studies research on the information leakage in
general purpose platforms. Cathy [81] explores side-channel
techniques to get the neuron and GEMM operator number in
CPU. Naghibijouybari et al. show that side-channel effect in
GPU platform can reveal the neuron numbers [82]. However,
no direct evidence shows that how these statistics are useful
to the attacking effectiveness. Targeting at the security in
11
the edge(e.g.automotive), this work is the FIRST to propose
the NN model extraction methodology and experimentally
conduct an end-to-end attack on an off-the-shelf GPU plat-
form immune to full system stack(e.g.pytorch+cuDNN).
9. CONCLUSION
The widespread use of neural network-based AI applica-
tions means that there is more incentive than ever before
for attackers extract an accurate picture of inner functioning
of their design. Through the acquisition of memory access
events from bus snooping, layer sequence identification by
the LSTM-CTC model, layer topology connection according
to the memory access pattern, and layer dimension estima-
tion under data volume constraints, we demonstrate one can
accurately recover the a similar network architecture as the
attack starting point. These reconstructed neural network
architectures present significant increase in attack success
rate.
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